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Abstract
There is a considerable degree of heterogeneity in the way how European banks present
their financial instruments in IFRS financial statements. In a sample of 109 European banks,
we identify three major presentation formats that are currently applied: a presentation by mea-
surement category, by product, and by purpose. We find the use of the measurement categories,
which were originally designed by IAS 39 for measurement purposes, as line items to be the
prevalent choice across countries. We analyze the factors that could explain this disclosure
choice. We find that a corresponding regulatory recommendation has a strong effect on the
choice. We further find that the disclosure of measurement categories is negatively associated
with the relative book value of financial assets measured at fair value. This finding suggests
discretionary disclosure management by banks. We conclude, based on behavioral theory, that
banks expect investors to have a negative bias in the risk perception of assets measured at fair
value.
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1 Introduction
The banking industry was once on the forefront of European IFRS adoption. One of the industry’s
major intentions was the accomplishment of greater comparability of financial statements across
Europe (Cairns (1996)). The decision to adopt IFRS was then a courageous one since there was
no comprehensive standard on accounting for financial instruments, by far the largest class of
any bank’s assets. Today, the guidance on how to account for financial instruments under IFRS
is published in a booklet of some 500 pages. Yet it remains doubtful whether the once astrived
comparability has indeed been accomplished. A major obstacle to comparability, and thereby to
decision-usefulness, is the non-uniform way in which banks present their financial instruments in
their financial statements. The aim of our paper is both to give a detailed description of today’s
heterogeneous practice and to explain the factors that might drive the disclosure management that
accounts for this heterogeneity.
Fair value measurement is involved in nearly any discussion on accounting for financial instru-
ments. Some European countries, such as Denmark, have a long tradition of measuring banks’
financial assets at fair value (Bernard et al. (1995)). In other countries, the implementation of fair
value accounting in the course of the adoption of IAS 39 was highly controversial and it was the
French government who finally arrived in the carve-out of some passages of the extant IAS 39
(Walton (2004)). It will thus not be surprising that our hypotheses on disclosure choices by Eu-
ropean banks are considering the effects of the current regime of fair value measurement. We can
do so because not only is the presentation of financial instruments left to a bank’s discretion but so
is the measurement of a remarkable portion of its financial assets and as a result, there will likely
be some interaction between a bank’s disclosure choice and its choice of a measurement base. We
strive to measure this interaction empirically.
In the due course of this analysis, we will approach a classical problem of accounting (or disclo-
sure) choice by a bank’s management that is motivated by several factors such as the risk perception
of its investors (and thus indirectly the pricing of its assets) or as third party relations, e.g. with
regulators (Fields et al. (2001)). We primarily focus on disclosure choices that are directly re-
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lated to the presentation of financial instruments on the face of the balance sheet. This focus is
justified by experimental evidence suggesting that easily accessible information from the balance
sheet corresponds more strongly with market prices than less easily accessible information from
the footnotes does and is therefore of greater importance in the strive for comparability (Dietrich
et al. (2001) and Bloomfield and Libby (1996)).
We try to capture the disclosure choice by means of a data set that is (for the most part) directly
collected from the financial statements of 109 European banks and that is unique in that it encodes
the presentation format of financial instruments based on the general and overall appearance of the
financial statement which is by its nature not recorded in standard data bases. We contribute to
the literature as we diligently develop a theoretical explanation for disclosure choice that is based
on extant behavioral theory and on prior experimental evidence suggesting that investors tend to
associate a higher risk with assets known to be measured at fair value than with other assets of the
same economic characteristics.
Our main result quite reliably confirms that management takes this bias into account when pre-
senting its financial assets. In particular, we find that the extent of a bank’s fair value measurement
is negatively associated with the probability of disclosing the measurement basis. This effect is
only partially offset by regulatory (non-binding) action taking place in some European countries.
We also analyze the disclosure of financial derivatives that are also subject of ample behavioral
research. We observe that disclosure of financial derivatives is not a strategic choice but rather
driven by the materiality of a bank’s derivative usage and thus (unlike the disclosure of measure-
ment bases) not limiting the comparability of financial statements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we present our research ques-
tions and we derive our hypotheses from prior research. In section 3, we present our descriptive
findings on the disclosure practice of banks across Europe. In section 4, we present and discuss
the results of a univariate analysis and a binary multivariate regression explaining the factors that
are associated with a certain pattern of disclosure choice identified in section 3. Conclusions and
implications of our study are discussed in section 5.
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2 Research Questions and Development of Hypotheses
Industry Practice in the Presentation of Financial Instruments
In general, there are three possibilities for banks to present their financial instruments on a
financial statement. The first possibility is a presentation by investment purpose that distinguishes,
for example, between a hedging and a trading instrument. The second possibility is a presentation
by type. This presentation format was advocated by the Joint Working Group (JWG) of Standard
Setters which particularly aimed at a distinction between derivative and non-derivative instruments
and later recommended in its draft standard on accounting for financial instruments (Joint Working
Group of Standard Setters, 1997, BC 5.1-5.5). Indeed, the detail of information about derivatives
usage provided by banks seems to have improved in the 1990’s at least in the US (Edwards and
Eller (1995) and Edwards and Eller (1996)). The third format is a presentation by measurement
category. IFRS 7 allows a bank to use those measurement categories that were introduced by
IAS 39 for measurement purposes as line items on the financial statement so that the choice of an
instrument’s measurement base might not only affect the company’s income but also presentation
and disclosure (Gornik-Tomaszewski (2006)).
There is still some theoretical controversy on whether the latter format is compatible with the
general presentation principles under IAS 1. The main point in this controversy is that IAS 1 de-
mands a separate presentation of financial assets held for investment purposes and of receivables
from goods and services which may however be classified into several different measurement cat-
egories. A presentation by measurement categories would thus fail to provide some information
required by IAS 1 (Löw (2006)) in that some line items will consist of both financial assets held for
investment purposes and receivables thereby not enabling investors to distinguish between these
two kinds of instruments. Our first research question is thus a simple positive question: Can we
infer from the disclosure practice of European banks which presentation formats of financial in-
struments are actually in conformity with extant IFRS? The actual practice of European banks is
of importance in this case as in the absence of a specific disclosure policy management has to base
its disclosure choice on professional judgment which is in the end tantamount to an interpretation
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of accounting standards in terms of industry practice (IAS 8.12). A widely applied disclosure pol-
icy that is accepted by auditors would under this rationale be in conformity with extant IFRS just
by itself. Insights into accepted industry practice are therefore indispensable to the application of
IFRS 7. We will refer to industry practice by testing two hypotheses:
H1a: There is a variety of formats applied by the European banking industry in the presentation
of financial statements.
H1b: A presentation by measurement categories is an accepted disclosure practice in the European
banking industry.
The test of these hypotheses calls for a descriptive analysis of presentation formats used in the
European banking industry. We will reject (H1a) if we cannot identify more than one presentation
format applied by more than one bank, i.e. we believe an accepted industry practice to be an im-
plicit disclosure option that is exercised by more than one individual bank. We will however not
restrict our analysis to a description of the set of accepted procedures but also, as it is the nature of
positive accounting theory, focus on explanations of banks’ choice among those accepted proce-
dures (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, p. 246) so that our second research question is: What drives
this disclosure choice? There are at least two general choices that differ by its nature. The first
choice is about the overall presentation format, i.e. a choice between the three presentation formats
identified above. The second choice is about the partition of global line items into subcategories,
e.g. a distinction between trading assets and designated assets among the financial assets in the
fair value category or a distinction between trading and hedging instruments among the financial
derivatives.
Choice of the Presentation Format
The way in which to present the financial statement is a particularly important disclosure choice
to be made by bank management since balance sheet information is of greater relevance for in-
vestors than any additional information in the footnotes. Dietrich et al. (2001) and Bloomfield and
Libby (1996) provide experimental evidence that the association between balance sheet informa-
tion and market prices is stronger than the association between footnote information and market
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prices. Corresponding empirical evidence for accounting information about financial derivatives
is given by Ahmed et al. (2006) and by McAnally (1996). With respect to short-term liabilities,
Gramlich et al. (2006) find that even debt ratings are affected by the balance sheet classification of
the instruments. Generally spoken, an identical underlying economic situation will be perceived
to be of different risk if the balance sheet does not appear in an identical format. It is thus reason-
able to assume that management’s choice of a presentation format for its financial statement is a
strategic one that can be explained by different factors.
A first explanation seems apparent. Banking institutions are like almost no other industry af-
fected by regulatory activity. Regulatory activity usually focuses on the enforcement of capital
restrictions and on additional risk disclosures besides the financial statement (Linsley and Shrives
(2005), Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2003)). There are however some national regu-
lating institutions that prescribe how to present the balance sheets in regulatory filings. An explicit
recommendation is given in several countries to present financial instruments by measurement
category (in the case of France see for example Commission Bancaire de la Banque de France
(2006)). Such a recommendation is in conformity with a guideline issued by the Committee of
European Banking Supervisors (CEBS (2007)) as an attempt to harmonize regulatory activity in
Europe. It is nevertheless non-binding since it is neither the responsibility nor the competence of
bank regulators to interpret financial reporting standards. A regulatory recommendation can thus
never override a presentation principle underlying the IFRS which is endorsed by the European
legislative. It can yet be hypothesized that there is a de facto effect of such a regulatory action that
is mainly due to costs arising from a non-conformity of regulatory filings and financial account-
ing. The costs may be modeled as C˜H if disclosure deviates from the regulatory filing and as C˜L
otherwise where E(CL)< E(CH) so that there is a direct effect of a regulatory recommendation on
the costs of disclosure: If a bank had to present its financial assets by measurement categories in
its reports to a regulatory institution, the use of another presentation format in external reports to
the capital markets would result in a net cost of C˜ = C˜H − C˜L the expected value of which would
be positive. The net cost of disclosing the measurement categories would in this case however be
0 as no transition of the accounting data is necessary.
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A second explanation is less apparent and it needs behavioral theory to establish the hypothesis
that also the extent to which fair value is implemented by a bank as a measurement base for its
financial instruments might affect disclosure choice. Behavioral theory has it that the individual
perception of information by investors and the use of this information in decision-making strongly
relies on the format in which the information is presented (i.e. on its framing, see Tversky and
Kahneman (1986)). One behavioral heuristic that is applied by decision-makers is representa-
tiveness (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)). The concept refers to the observation that investors
base their judgment of new information on its representativeness for certain events (Shleifer, 2000,
p. 112). Another heuristic classified as association-based error are labeling or availability effects
(see Folkes (1988) and Levin et al. (1985) for examples). These effects describe how easily ex-
amples of certain events come to the mind of decision-makers and thereby affect the probability
attached to these events. As a result, decision-makers will judge events which are easier to recall
or imagine to be more common (Hirshleifer (2001)).
There is by now some convincing evidence how the distinction of a certain type of financial
instrument, i.e. the ease by which decision-makers can recall it, will result in a biased risk percep-
tion by investors. The ease is particularly high for financial derivatives due to investor’s cognitive
availability of losses from derivatives usage broadly covered in the media (Koonce et al. (2005a),
Koonce et al. (2005b), and Koonce et al. (2006)). This is a serious case against the JWG approach
to present financial instruments by type. Furthermore, the same argument might hold as regards
the presentation of financial instruments by measurement base. Reasonable investors with a basic
knowledge of IFRS accounting could readily be aware of the IASB’s repeatedly and publicly stated
objective to measure at least those instruments at fair value that are exposed to short-term market
risk and that in particular unexceptionally all financial derivatives are regarded to be exposed to
that kind of risk. The more financial assets a bank presents under the label of fair value measure-
ment, the more likely will investors then be to associate short-term market risk with the bank -
even though the same instruments might just as well be involved in a well-hedged trading strat-
egy. This negative association could easily have been established by media coverage as fair value
measurement was at the core of the political controversies surrounding the adoption of IAS 39
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(see Walton (2004) or Hague (2004)). Besides the French government, it was especially the ECB
which stressed the volatility of that measurement base and its potential risks for the whole banking
industry (European Central Bank (2004), see Armstrong et al. (2007) for a timeline of IAS 39
implementation in Europe).
A potential net cost of not disclosing measurement categories resulting from regulatory action
could thus be offset by the negative effects of investor’s biases in the risk perception of the fair value
category. The negative effect can be theoretically motivated if management’s utility function was
in some way directly linked to firm value and accordingly to the cost of capital. A managemenent
compensation function establishes such a link (for the ease of discussion we neglect potential
agency problems in the due course). Lambert et al. (2007) have shown that cost of capital generally
depends on investors’ assessment of the covariance between the cash flows of a firm with the
cash flows of all market participants. The assessment of the variance of a firm’s own cash flows
forms part of this evaluation. This is where we can combine classical capital market theory and
the insights from behavioral theory discussed above: It is the variance of the cash flows of two
economically alike banks that is perceived to differ if investors learn that fair value measurement
is applied by one bank but not by the other bank. There is ample evidence that volatile earnings are
thought to be riskier than smooth earnings (Graham et al. (2005)) and that fair value measurement
in the mixed accounting model under extant IAS 39 results in more volatile earnings (for financial
instruments in the banking industry: Conclusions from a simulation model (2004)). This is an
economic explanation why a bank exposed to interest rate risk and disclosing a fair value label
on the face of the balance sheet is judged to be of higher risk than an identically exposed bank
disclosing fair value results solely in the notes (see Hirst et al. (2004) for experimental evidence).1
In terms of a pricing model, a higher risk is tantamount to a higher variance of cash flows.
It is now straight forward to compare the advantages and the disadvantages of a presentation by
measurement categories. Let X˜ denote a fictitious present value of a bank’s total assets if the risk
1 In another chapter of my dissertation, I use experimental methods to verify that effect. According to my results,
risk perception of banks varies with the measurement category a financial instrument is classified into (p < .01).
The risk of a bank presenting the fair value category is judged to be higher than the risk of banks presenting trading
instruments or available for sale instruments (p < .01). See Bischof and Ebert (2007) for a detailed discussion.
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premium is unbiased and let R(θ)≤ 1 denote the discount factor on the (fictitious) present value of
those assets that are presented under a fair value label where ∂R∂θ < 0 since the estimated variance
of the bank’s cash flows increases with the extent of fair value measurement denoted by θ. The
resulting loss from fair value disclosure is thus L˜ = (1−R(θ))θX˜ where ∂L˜∂θ > 0. Management
can avoid L˜ either by foregoing the fair value option and thereby minimizing the extent of fair
value measurement or by opting for another presentation format than the measurement categories.
Forgoing the fair value option would however be contrary to evidence that, if the company’s trading
portfolio is sufficiently well hedged, income measurement on fair value basis positively affects a
company’s perception by analysts (Hirst et al. (2004)) and that fair value measurement of financial
assets provides higher value relevance compared to amortized costs (Barth (1994), Eccher et al.
(1996) or Venkatachalam (1996)). Hence, by opting for another presentation format as a mean of
disclosure management, banks could still gain from the positive effects of income measurement on
basis of fair values and at the same time avoid the negative effects from the use of fair value as a
label on the financial statement. We are now able to derive a probability of management disclosing
its measurement categories on the face of the balance sheet. It is identical with the probability P
of L˜ being smaller than C˜. P(L˜ < C˜) is decreasing with θ increasing and it is increasing the more
explicitly national bank regulation demands filings in which measurement categories are used as
line items. In the latter case, the cost of disclosure would be particularly high. From this, we can
derive two hypotheses that we are going to test empirically:
H2a: The probability of a bank disclosing its measurement bases on the face of its balance sheet
is negatively associated with the extent of fair value measurement.
H2b: The probability of a bank disclosing its measurement bases on the face of its balance sheet
is positively associated with the existence of a (non-binding) recommendation by a national
regulation authority concerning the presentation format.
Choice of the Presentation Depth
Since (H2a) and (H2b) are derived from behavioral theory, we shall focus more specifically on
two line items that are subject of bias research in that field: financial assets measured at fair value
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and financial derivatives. Both items are heterogeneous in nature and could thus be partitioned
into subcategories. The fair value category on the one hand contains both assets held for trading
and assets voluntarily designated for fair value measurement. Financial derivatives on the other
hand can be either hedging instruments or trading instruments held for speculative purposes. An
unbiased disclosure choice of the depth of presentation would only consider the materiality of
the respective item for the individual bank. The extent of fair value measurement and the extent
of derivatives usage would in this case be positively associated with the probability of a bank
partitioning each category in its financial statement. An offsetting effect could again be triggered
by a biased risk perception of investors. With respect to the fair value category, the association
with volatility, i.e. a higher assessment of the cash flow variance, could keep management from
placing more emphasis on the line item by partitioning it into trading instruments and (voluntarily)
designated instruments so that we had to reject the following null:
H3a: The separate disclosure of financial assets held for trading and financial assets voluntarily
designated for fair value measurement is positively associated with the materiality (i.e. the
relative value) of a bank’s fair value category.
Evidence on the risk perception of financial derivatives is more ambiguous. On the one hand,
management is aware of the findings on the availability of negative media coverage discussed
above. Bodnar and Gebhardt (1999) and Vietze (1997) found in survey studies that a substantial
number of managers anticipated a lack of knowledge about derivatives usage and the resulting
negative associations in their disclosure choices. Besides there is a tendency to hide speculative
involvement with financial derivatives (Benston and Mian (1995)). On the other hand, more recent
findings suggest that the risk associated with derivatives usage significantly decreases if the hedg-
ing purpose is made explicit, i.e. if hedging instruments are presented separately (Koonce et al.
(2005a)). This finding can be explained by evidence that certain classes of financial derivatives
indeed reduce the risk exposure of banks (Guay (1999), McAnally (1996)). The null will thus only
be rejected if the first effect is dominant:
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H3b: The separate disclosure of financial derivatives held for trading and those held for hedging
is positively associated with the materiality (i.e. the relative value) of a bank’s derivatives
usage.
3 Disclosure Practice of European Banks
3.1 Sample
Our sample consists of 109 banks from 28 different European countries. All banks included in
the sample present their audited group accounts in accordance with IFRS. Banks were selected
on a random basis with the only restriction that at least two banks from each country were to be
included. The sample can thus regarded to be representative for European banks that apply IFRS.
The restriction was introduced as the study also aims to analyze possible cross-country differences
in the presentation of financial instruments. Data on equity listings and on selected capital as
well as financial ratios is taken from the BvD BankScope database. Most of the data however is
collected directly from the 2006 financial statements of the banks. The statement of each bank
was carefully analyzed in two respects. On the one hand, we were interested in the exact labels
of the line items under which financial instruments were presented. On the other hand, we used
information provided in the footnotes about the measurement categories that those financial assets
were classified into under IAS 39. The data contained in our sample is thus unique.
Descriptive statistics on bank size (total assets) and on the number of line items on the face of the
balance sheet that are used to present financial instruments are summarized and differentiated by
countries in table 1. The summary shows that banks are extremely heterogeneous in size with total
assets within a range from 77m. to 1,491,388m. EUR. The heterogeneity is due to our objective
to consider a large number of European countries in the sample. This makes it though necessary
to control for size in our later analysis of disclosure choice. The data is not as heterogeneous in
the number of line items analyzed. 91 out of the 109 banks use between 4 and 6 different line
items to present their financial instruments. Only one bank (from Estonia) uses the minimum of
2 and only one bank (from the Czech Republic) uses the maximum of 8 items. Thereby, we do
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not consider items representing cash or cash equivalents because we found their presentation to be
sufficiently uniform across Europe. Neither did we consider investments in associates that were
measured at equity since those assets are explicitly exempt from the scope of IAS 32, IAS 39 and
IFRS 7 (IAS 32.4(a) and IAS 39.2(a)). As our main objective is to analyze the presentation format
as well as some selected line items but not the overall presentation depth of bank statements, we
further regarded in a few cases different line items that were very similar in nature to be identical.
3.2 Findings on Industry Practice
Three different presentation formats can be identified that are applied by more than 10 European
banks in our sample. More than half of the banks (51.4%) present their financial instruments along
those categories that were originally introduced by IAS 39 for measurement purposes. There are
still 17 banks (15.6%), most of them from Northern Europe, that follow the JWG approach to
present the instruments by product type. This is a substantial decrease over the last decade since
Vietze (1997) has found that 63% of survey respondents regarded a classification by the types of
financial instruments (particularly financial derivatives) as desirable. As outlined in section 2 of
this paper, both these formats are challenged not to be in accordance with the general presentation
principles underlying IAS 1. Only 13 banks (11.9%), however, acknowledge this lack of consis-
tency between IAS 1 and IFRS 7 and present their financial instruments by purpose - a format that
is compatible with both IAS 1 and IFRS 7. Only in Germany and in Austria, those banks are in the
majority. A detailed summary of the presentation formats used in each country is given in table 2.
Given the evidence presented in table 2, we are already able to conclude that we definitely
fail to reject our hypothesis (H1b). The data rather suggests that the measurement categories
introduced by IAS 39 are widely used in the presentation of financial instruments and that this
establishes an accepted accounting practice in the European banking industry. In conformity with
IAS 8.12, such a prevalent industry practice shall be a guidance in management’s interpretation
of IFRS 7. Thus, even if professional judgment is, due to the lack of guidance on disclosure
policy, required in that decision, the choice of a presentation format will not be impeded by the
potential inconsistency between IFRS 7 and IAS 1 which is argued to inhibit a presentation by
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measurement categories (see above, section 2). We even find that there are some further banks
not consistently applying a presentation by measurement categories but presenting at least some
selected measurement categories along with other line items. This finding is true especially for
the fair value category and for assets classified as loans & receivables. Whereas only 56 banks
present all measurement categories being used, 67 banks (61.5%) present the total amount of assets
measured at fair value through profit & loss and 72 banks (66.1%) present their loans & receivables
on the face of their financial statement.
Banks differ however quite substantially in the way these two categories are presented (see
table 3 for the details). This is particularly due to the fact that a wide variety of different financial
assets can be classified in either category. Derivatives and trading assets are generally classified
into the fair value category and approximately half of the banks, independent of the presentation
format used, present separate information on these two asset classes. Assets that are optionally
measured at fair value are on the other hand only separately presented, again by half of the banks,
if a bank does also present the overall category separately. Loans & receivables mainly differ in
the counterparty. It is common to subdivide the presentation of the category into receivables from
customers and into those from other credit institutions. It is much less common also to present
receivables from public institutions separately. Overall, it is interesting to see that the general
presentation format is, except for the use of the fair value option, without immediate effect on the
presentation of subclasses of assets contained in these categories.
We further conclude that we also fail to reject hypothesis (H1a) stating that there is more than
one acceptable presentation policy for financial statements in the banking industry. The positive
findings on disclosure choices by European banks indicate that there is a de facto choice between
at least three general presentation formats. Notwithstanding a de jure answer to the normative
problem whether all those formats are consistent with IAS 1, we do observe a non-uniform pre-
sentation of financial instruments across Europe. Since theory predicts managerial flexibility in
recognition and disclosure as one effect of inconsistent accounting rules (Wüstemann and Kierzek
(2007)), it is at least possible that the inconsistency between the general presentation principles
under IAS 1 and the more specific rules under IFRS 7 has actually driven the variety of disclosure
12
choices. If we accept that a consequence of a non-uniform application of accounting rules is a lack
of comparability and thereby a severe violation of the theoretical concept of decision-usefulness
that is very strongly articulated by the IFRS Conceptual Framework, this finding calls for activity
of either the standard setter itself or of the European enforcement institutions.
4 Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Choice
From our results in section 3, we can derive that there is, under IFRS 7, a general disclosure
choice for banks how to present their financial instruments to investors. The findings suggest
that there is a particular choice whether to present the measurement categories on the face of the
financial statement. A disclosure of the measurement categories will generally come along with a
disclosure of the use of fair value as a measurement base. The literature summarized in section 2
gives theoretical arguments for incentives both to disclose fair value measurement and to conceal
it. An answer can thus only given on an empirical basis. Our comprehensive data on line items
used in the financial statements of European banks proves to be useful for that purpose.
We model the disclosure behavior of a bank as a binary choice. Our dependent variable, MEAS-
DSCL, takes a value of 1 if a bank discloses its measurement categories in its financial statement
and a value of 0 otherwise. The three test variables, FVREL, TRADREL and BANKREG, are in-
ferred from our hypotheses (H2) and (H3). FVREL represents the relative book value of a bank’s
financial assets that are measured at fair value through profit & loss (as a fraction of the book value
of total assets). We use it as a proxy for the extent to which a bank applies fair value as a measure-
ment base. In accordance with (H2a) and (H3a) we expect FVREL to be negatively associated with
the choice to disclose the measurement categories and to be positively associated with the separate
disclosure of trading assets and designated assets in the fair value category. TRADREL is the ratio
of the book value of a bank’s trading assets to the book value of its total assets. We use it as a
proxy for the extent of derivatives usage since we assume a larger trading activity to be tantamount
to a more extensive use of financial derivatives. In accordance with (H3b) we expect TRADREL
to be positively associated with the separate disclosure of financial derivatives. BANKREG is a
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dummy variable that refers to the regulatory environment of a bank and is thus used in our tests of
(H2b). It takes a value of 1 if a national regulatory institution explicitly recommends a presenta-
tion by measurement categories. In accordance with (H2b), we expect the variable to be positively
associated with MEASDSCL.
Univariate Analysis
In a univariate analysis of (H2a) and (H2b), we first test for differences in the means of FVREL
and in the proportions of BANKREG between the two groups of banks that are separated by
MEASDSCL. The statistical results are summarized in table 5. Banks that disclose its measure-
ment categories have, on average, a relative book value of assets measured at fair value through
profit & loss of .1191. We find an average book value of .1815 for banks that conceal its mea-
surement categories, at least on their financial statements. The difference is significant (two-sided
p-value = .026). The results are also significant for our findings on the effect of regulatory recom-
mendations. Only 2% of the banks concealing its categories do so in opposition to a regulatory
recommendation, whereas 40% of the disclosing banks do so in conformity with an existing regu-
latory recommendation (two-sided p-value < .01).
A univariate test of (H3a) does not yield a significant result. The extent of fair value measure-
ment is smaller in banks separately disclosing trading assets and designated assets (.1201) than in
banks not doing so (.1563). Bank regulation on the other hand also affects the disclosure of the
fair value category significantly. Concerning the disclosure of derivatives (H3b), we can observe
that materiality is the determining factor of presentation depth. The total book value of derivatives
is significantly higher (two sided p-value =.045) in banks separately disclosing derivatives usage
than in other banks.
Empirical Model
The findings suggest that FVREL and BANKREG do affect the choice of MEASDSCL in op-
posite directions just as we hypothesized based on our theoretical model in section 2. We now
assume normality in the distribution of the error terms (Maddala (1991)) so that we are able to
transform our theoretical model in a joint model that can be tested empirically by means of a
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probit regression. The probability of a bank disclosing its measurement categories can then be
described as
Pr(Yi = 1|Xi) =Φ(X ′iβ)
for banks i = 1,2, . . . ,n, where Yi denotes the dependent variable, i.e. either MEASDSCL, FVD-
SCL or DERDSCL, and Xi denotes a vector of explanatory individual-level variables that varies in
scope and content between models I, II, and III. Such an ordinary probit regression is a common
method in the analysis of accounting choice in general (see, e.g., Leuz (2003) for the choice be-
tween IFRS and U.S. GAAP, or Beatty and Weber (2006) for the decision on a goodwill write-off)
so that it seems reasonable to apply it in our specific model of disclosure choice. We will use the
same general model to test the probability of management’s choice of FVDSCL and of DERDSCL
dependent on FVREL and TRADREL, respectively.
In a probit regression, we are able to use further control variables that are omitted in the uni-
variate analysis but that were identified in other studies as being explanatory for disclosure or
accounting choice and the omission of their potentially confounding effects could thus bias our re-
sults. Wasley and Wu (2006) for example find analyst following to be explanatory for the decision
to voluntarily disclose cash flow forecast. We use the public listing of a bank’s equity instrument
as a proxy for analyst following. LISTING is used as a binary control variable taking a value of
1 if at least one equity instrument of a bank is publicly listed. It can explain disclosure choice
if public investors have different informational needs than private investors. Size is regarded to
be another explanatory variable in various settings (see Kerstein and Rai (2007) or Baginski et al.
(2004) for recent examples). We use the natural logarithm of the book value of a bank’s total as-
sets as a proxy for size (LNBV). Other factors that might explain disclosure choice are a bank’s
leverage and its profitability (Gramlich et al. (2001)). Therefore, we introduce EQUITY (a bank’s
ratio of the total book value of equity to the book value of its total assets) and RETURN (a bank’s
ratio of net income to its book value of equity) into the matrix of control variables. In order to
control for differences in corporate governance that might explain different disclosure choices, we
use BOARD (the number of board managers as reported by BankScope) as a proxy for the quality
of corporate governance. Descriptive statistics on all variables can be found in table 4. For the
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analysis of FVDSCL, we include BANKREG as a further control variable because a regulatory
recommendation for a presentation by measurement categories also affects the way in which the
fair value category is presented.
In model I, we test for the exclusive effects of the test variables on the disclosure choice. In
model III, we introduce the complete matrix of control variables to reduce a potential endogeneity
bias in the coefficients on the test variables. In model II, we omit BANKREG in order to observe a
potential interaction with the test variable FVREL. (Model II is of course redundant in the analysis
of DERDSCL.) Since we identified several country patterns in section 3 of this paper, we use robust
standard errors where countries serve as clusters. All statistics are summarized in tables 6-8.
Results
The results seem to underline our findings in the univariate analysis. In individual tests of the
effect on MEASDSCL, the coefficients on both explanatory variables are significantly different
from zero in all three models. This result holds at a 5% level in a simultaneous test on both co-
efficients using Scheffé’s S-method. The coefficient on BANKREG is fairly robust in models I
and III. The results suggest that a regulatory recommendation to present the measurement cate-
gories increases the probability of a corresponding disclosure, on average, by an absolute amount
of approximately .54. This is the hypothesized direction. The introduction of control variables
particularly affects the coefficient on FVREL which is however still significant in the hypothesized
direction (negative). A 1% increase in assets measured at fair value will result, on average, in a
decrease of the probability to disclose the category of approximately 1.3%. Obviously, there are
indeed some confounding effects on this particular setting that are caused by variables that have
shown to be explanatory for disclosure choice in other non-industry specific settings. Those vari-
ables do however not seem to explain the disclosure behavior of banks. As can be seen from the
FVREL coefficient in model II, there is almost no confounding effect of BANKREG on FVREL.
We can thus use either model II or model III in the interpretation of our results on FVREL. In total,
the results are strong evidence not to reject (H2a) and (H2b).
The findings are similar for tests of the effects on FVDSCL (summarized in table 7) suggesting
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that the choices how to disclose the fair value category and whether to disclose the measurement
categories at all are indeed related. In contrast to the univariate analysis, the probit regression
yields significant coefficients for FVREL at a 5% level. The coefficient is negative so that we reject
(H3a). The disclosure of the fair value category is obviously not driven by its materiality but by
strategic considerations of the management that we explain in section 2 with behavioral theory. In
addition, BANKREG and LNBV are control variables of their own significant explanatory power.
We find the opposite result for the disclosure of financial derivatives (table 8). The coefficient for
TRADREL, i.e. our proxy for the extent of a bank’s derivatives usage, is significantly positive at
a 5% level both in model I and when considering the control variables in model III. This finding
suggests that this choice is not a strategic one but determined by materiality so that we cannot
reject (H3b). The overall statistical significance of the model as well as its predictive power are
however substantially lower than in the analysis of MEASDSCL and of FVDSCL.
5 Implications and Conclusions
We analyze the disclosure choice of banks in two ways. In a first part, we describe certain dis-
closure patterns across Europe that result in a non-uniform presentation of financial instruments in
IFRS financial statements of banks. In a second part, we explain the observed disclosure choices
with the use of fair value as a measurement base for financial assets and with regulatory action.
We are able to identify three different general formats in the presentation of financial instru-
ments. The prevalent format across Europe is the use of the categories introduced by IAS 39 for
measurement purposes as line items on the financial statement. The second format is a presentation
by products. This is the approach once strongly advocated by the JWG of Standard Setters. Today,
it is applied by less than 20% of European banks. Even less important from a practical point of
view is the third format, i.e. a presentation of financial instruments by purpose. If we accept that
the high degree of heterogeneity in the presentation of financial instruments across banks results
in a lack of comparability and thereby negatively affects the decision-usefulness of IFRS financial
statements, this finding calls for a more distinct interpretation of the presentation principles under
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IFRS 7. This may be achieved by standard setting itself but it may also achieved by action of
European enforcement institutions.
One apparent factor influencing the disclosure choice is the regulatory environment of a bank.
Some national regulating institutions explicitly recommend a presentation of financial instruments
by measurement categories. There is significant evidence in our sample that such a regulatory
action indeed strongly affects a bank’s disclosure choice. As the CEBS guideline proposing this
approach will be adopted by more and more national regulatory authorities, this tendency will be
accelerated.
However, there is also evidence for discretionary action of banks, i.e. for self-serving disclosure
management of banks. We argue with respect to prior bevioral findings that particularly the use
of fair value as a measurement base causes a bias in investors’ risk perception and we hypothesize
that banks are aware of that bias and thus try to exploit it by corresponding reporting behavior. We
find that the relative amount of assets that is measured at fair value through profit & loss is indeed,
together with regulatory action, a significant explanatory factor in a bank’s disclosure choice. The
association is thereby negative, i.e. the higher the extent to which a bank has implemented a fair
value measurement, the less likely it is to disclose the use of the category in its financial statement.
This is empirical evidence supporting the results of experimental studies suggesting a negative
perception of fair value measurement by investors.
Our evidence further suggests that there is no disclosure management in the reporting of fi-
nancial derivatives which is rather driven by the materiality of a bank’s derivatives usage. Since
previous findings on the contribution of financial derivatives to a bank’s risk exposure are ambigu-
ous, bank management does obviously not fear negative market reaction to the disclosure of the
involvement with derivatives. This seems to be a change in disclosure practice since there is some
evidence from the 1990’s documenting a reservation towards derivatives disclosure (Bodnar and
Gebhardt (1999), Vietze (1997)). The discussion about the potential danger of financial derivatives
has obviously somewhat becalmed since then. This might indicate that the biases in the public
perception of fair value measurement will vanish just as well with time passing by.
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We do not attempt to give an answer to the normative question concerning the social value of a
certain degree of bank disclosure and the potentially negative effect of disclosure management on
this value (see Anagnostopoulos and Buckland (2005), Baumann and Nier (2004), or Berlin (2004)
on related questions). Neither did we discuss implications of the observed disclosure management
for security pricing at capital markets (see Ahmed et al. (2006), Eccher et al. (1996), or Wang et al.
(2005) on related questions). Both a limitation and a uniqueness of this study is that the application
of IFRS 7 was still voluntary in 2006 so that we could observe some disclosure practices that are by
now restricted. The effect of the mandatory implementation of IFRS 7 is a field for future research
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Descriptive Statistics: Size and Line Items of European Banks
Size (Total assets, m. EUR) # Line Items Analyzed
Country N
Mean Std.Dev. Median Min Max Sum Min Max
Total 109 226,062 393,132 27,040 77 1,491,388 548 2 8
Austria 3 116,046 65,449 115,629 50,806 181,703 17 5 7
Belgium 3 536,463 226,190 508,761 325,400 775,229 17 4 7
Croatia 2 940 840 940 346 1,534 8 4 4
Cyprus 4 12,132 13,618 11,496 348 25,187 21 4 7
Czech Rep. 3 18,340 15,217 26,501 783 27,735 17 4 8
Denmark 3 134,436 201,788 21,547 14,357 367,404 19 5 7
Estonia 3 129 90 78 77 233 8 2 3
Finland 5 16,274 19,866 6,667 698 47,260 21 3 5
France 6 806,197 534,244 748,276 214,313 1,440,343 32 5 6
Germany 3 615,484 434,214 608,339 184,887 1,053,226 13 4 5
Greece 6 18,411 19,416 12,177 2,512 49,800 30 4 6
Hungary 3 12,753 13,680 7,933 2,136 28,190 16 4 6
Iceland 4 22,983 17,420 23,726 933 43,546 21 4 6
Ireland 4 124,191 58,467 117,331 73,290 188,813 22 4 7
Italy 6 268,525 351,998 78,967 7,474 823,284 35 4 7
Latvia 2 2,431 1,568 2,431 1,322 3,540 10 5 5
Lithuania 3 485 408 402 125 927 16 5 6
Malta 2 3,008 3,408 3,008 599 5,418 7 3 4
Netherlands 3 932,287 339,455 987,100 556,455 1,226,307 15 3 7
Norway 4 49,583 74,481 16,460 5,150 160,262 21 4 7
Poland 4 12,885 8,852 9,620 6,445 25,855 20 4 6
Portugal 6 49,245 35,032 47,797 9,151 96,245 31 4 6
Slovakia 4 3,753 3,241 3,678 656 6,998 21 5 6
Slovenia 5 4,839 5,508 2,897 666 14,409 25 4 6
Spain 7 241,314 293,686 91,650 23,782 833,872 34 4 5
Sweden 4 227,132 84,391 205,989 149,660 346,890 19 4 5
Switzerland 2 754,608 1,041,964 754,608 17,828 1,491,388 11 5 6
UK 5 1,117,377 411,613 1,297,739 511,687 1,484,419 21 3 5
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TABLE 2:
Primary Presentation Format of IFRS Financial Statements of European Banks (by Country)
Primary Presentation Format
Country
Measurement Product Purpose Other




Cyprus 2 1 1
Czech Rep. 2 1
Denmark 2 1
Estonia 1 2
Finland 1 2 2
France 6
Germany 2 1
Greece 3 2 1
Hungary 1 2
Iceland 2 1 1














UK 1 1 1 2
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TABLE 3:
Presentation of Individual Measurement Categories
Panel A. Fair Value Category
Absolute Amount of Assets Measured at FV
Separate Disclosure of ...
Separate Disclosure No Separate Disclosure
N 67 42
Trading Assets 37 (55.22%) 19 (45.24%)
Use of FV Option 34 (50.75%) -
Trading Assets and FV Option 29 (42.28%) -
Derivatives 33 (49.25%) 24 (57.14%)
Panel B. Loans & Receivables
Separate Disclosure of Absolute Amount of Loans & Receivables
L&R from ... Separate Disclosure No Separate Disclosure
N 72 37
Customers 51 (70.83%) 19 (51.35%)
Credit Institutions 53 (73.61%) 28 (75.68%)
Public Institutions 2 (2.78%) 5 (13.5%)
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TABLE 4:
Analysis of Disclosure Choice: Descriptive statisticsa
Variable Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum
MEASDSCL .5504 .4997 1 0 1
FVDSCL .2661 .4439 0 0 1
DERDSCL .5229 .5018 1 0 1
FVREL .1465 .1442 .11 0 .71
TRADREL .0641 .0895 .04 0 .59
BANKREG .2294 .4224 0 0 1
LISTING .6972 .4616 1 0 1
EQUITY .0682 .0436 .06 .02 .36
RETURN .1453 .0881 .15 -.29 .43
LNBV 10.2300 2.5719 10.21 4.34 14.22
LNFV 7.9138 3.3780 8.04 -.66 13.52
BOARD 16.0490 11.4307 13 1 51
a Definition of the variables:
MEASDSCL 1 if bank discloses measurement categories separately; 0 otherwise
FVDSCL 1 if bank partitions fair value category on the financial statement; 0 otherwise
DERDSCL 1 if bank partitions financial derivatives on the financial statement; 0 otherwise
FVREL ratio of assets measured at FV through P/L to total assets (book value)
TRADREL ratio of assets held for trading to total assets (book value)
BANKREG 1 if national bank regulation recommends disclosure of measurement categories; 0 oth-
erwise
LISTING 1 if at least one class of equity instruments of the bank is publicly traded; 0 otherwise
EQUITY ratio of total equity to total assets (book value)
RETURN ratio of total profit to total equity (book value)
LNBV (natural) log of total assets (book value)
BOARD number of board managers
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TABLE 5:
Univariate Analysis of Disclosure Choice
Panel A. Disclosure of Measurement Categories
MEASDSCL=0a MEASDSCL=1b Test Statisticc
N 47 60
.1815 .1191 |t0|= 2.2649FVREL
(.0242) (.0154) (.026)
.0204 .4000 |z0|= 4.6892dBANKREG
(.0202) (.0632) (< .01)
Panel B. Disclosure of Fair Value Category
FVDSCL=0a FVDSCL=1b Test Statisticc
N 78 29
.1563 .1201 |t0|= 1.1551FVREL
(.0181) (.0164) (.2507)
.1500 .4483 |z0|= 3.2731dBANKREG
(.0399) (.0923) (< .01)
Panel C. Disclosure of Derivatives
DERDSCL=0a DERDSCL=1b Test Statisticc
N 51 57
.0459 .0804 |t0|= 2.0247TRADREL
(.0086) (.0141) (.045)
a Sample mean with standard error in parentheses.
b Sample mean with standard error in parentheses.
c Two-sided p-value in parentheses.
d Fisher’s exact test also gives p-values < .01.
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TABLE 6:
Models of Disclosure Choice (1): Coefficients and Average Derivatives (Probit)
Dependent variable MEASDSCL
Model I II III
Independent variable (#) (+) (#) (+) (#) (+)




-2.4297 -.9324 -3.5598 -1.4046 -3.5255 -1.3578FVREL
(.9670) (1.388) (1.3714)
1.9485 .5319 - - 2.0287 .5459BANKREG*
(.5306) - (.5832)
Control Variables
- - -.2389 -.0932 -.2496 -.0944LISTING*
- (.2781) (.3149)
- - -.0284 -.0112 -.0395 .0015EQUITY
- (.0283) (.0246)
- - -1.1900 -.4695 -.2326 -.0896RETURN
- (1.3728) (1.2782)
- - .0794 .0313 .0060 .0023LNBV
- (.0892) (.0881)
- - .0007 .0003 -.0155 .0060BOARD
- (.0145) (.0136)
ln L -57.35 -62.68 -51.53
% correctly predicted 71.96 65.00 72.00
χ2 (p-value) 16.13 (< .001) 15.59 (.016) 23.85 (.001)
(#) The coefficient is reported with the robust standard error in parentheses (clusters by country).
(+) dy/dx is evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.
For binary variables marked with an asterisk (*), dy/dx is equal to the difference in the probability
of MEASDSCL for a discrete change in the value from 0 to 1.
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TABLE 7:
Models of Disclosure Choice (2): Coefficients and Average Derivatives (Probit)
Dependent variable FVDSCL
Model I II III
Independent variable (#) (+) (#) (+) (#) (+)




-1.3390 -.4305 -4.1076 -1.3087 -3.9545 -1.2117FVREL
(1.1942) (2.0113) (1.7761)
Control Variables
.9267 .3300 - - .9790 .3403BANKREG*
(.3985) - (.4373)
- - -.3319 -.1104 -.3054 -.0978LISTING*
- (.3965) (.4361)
- - -.0043 -.0014 -.0059 -.0018EQUITY
- (.0302) (.0304)
- - 2.4213 .7714 3.6775 1.1268RETURN
- (2.0708) (2.2136)
- - .2638 .0840 .2270 .0696LNBV
- (.1135) (.1048)
- - -.0104 -.0033 -.0196 -.0060BOARD
- (.0155) (.0122)
ln L -56.94 -52.80 -48.83
% correctly predicted 75.70 75.00 73.00
χ2 (p-value) 9.91 (.007) 14.75 (.022) 29.28 (< .001)
(#) The coefficient is reported with the robust standard error in parentheses (clusters by country).
(+) dy/dx is evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.
For binary variables marked with an asterisk (*), dy/dx is equal to the difference in the probability
of FVDSCL=1 for a discrete change in the value from 0 to 1.
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TABLE 8:
Models of Disclosure Choice (3): Coefficients and Average Derivatives (Probit)
Dependent variable DERDSCL
Model I III





3.3392 1.3277 5.5166 2.1936TRADREL
(1.6334) (2.4505)
Control Variables
- - .4063 .1610LISTING*
- (.3236)
- - -.0221 -.0088EQUITY
- (.0379)
- - 1.2164 .4837RETURN
- (1.3962)
- - -.1348 -.0536LNBV
- (.0838)
- - .0336 .0134BOARD
- (.0130)
ln L -72.41 -64.49
% correctly predicted 60.19 58.82
χ2 (p-value) 4.19 (.041) 11.77 (.067)
(#) The coefficient is reported with the robust standard error in parentheses (clusters by country).
(+) dy/dx is evaluated at the mean of the independent variables.
For binary variables marked with an asterisk (*), dy/dx is equal to the difference in the probability
of DERDSCL=1 for a discrete change in the value from 0 to 1.
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